VeraCrypt
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authorMounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr>2017-07-02 17:35:12 (GMT)
committerMounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr>2017-07-02 17:36:53 (GMT)
commitd1b26d4bfefe4d7f8581d4555e6634c3603772ed (patch)
treeb71140fbd82edd05e1696902069d2779d14c9d11
parenta0f2ffb90bf004b08fc4d3e317718d5a78fb54d5 (diff)
downloadVeraCrypt-d1b26d4bfefe4d7f8581d4555e6634c3603772ed.zip
VeraCrypt-d1b26d4bfefe4d7f8581d4555e6634c3603772ed.tar.gz
Windows: fix documentation and UI messages about the PIM constraints and calculation formula when EFI system encryption is using SHA-512 or Whirlpool. For historical reasons, if SHA-512 or Whirlpool is selected for EFI system encryption, then iterations = 15000 + (PIM x 1000) and not iterations = PIM x 2048 like the other algorithms.
-rw-r--r--doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chmbin1889759 -> 1889911 bytes
-rw-r--r--doc/html/Personal Iterations Multiplier (PIM).html8
-rw-r--r--src/Common/Password.c9
-rw-r--r--src/Common/Password.h2
-rw-r--r--src/Format/Tcformat.c8
-rw-r--r--src/Mount/Mount.c14
6 files changed, 27 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm b/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm
index fb895ef..9615fad 100644
--- a/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm
+++ b/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm
Binary files differ
diff --git a/doc/html/Personal Iterations Multiplier (PIM).html b/doc/html/Personal Iterations Multiplier (PIM).html
index b039a74..d2da3b7 100644
--- a/doc/html/Personal Iterations Multiplier (PIM).html
+++ b/doc/html/Personal Iterations Multiplier (PIM).html
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
Header Key Derivation</a>).</p>
<p>When a PIM value is specified, the number of iterations is calculated as follows:</p>
<ul>
-<li>For system encryption: Iterations = <strong>PIM x 2048</strong> </li><li>For non-system encryption and file containers: Iterations = <strong>15000 &#43; (PIM x 1000)</strong>
+<li>For system encryption that doesn't use SHA-512 or Whirlpool: Iterations = <strong>PIM x 2048</strong> </li><li>For system encryption that uses SHA-512 or Whirlpool, non-system encryption and file containers: Iterations = <strong>15000 &#43; (PIM x 1000)</strong>
</li></ul>
<p>Prior to version 1.12, the security of a VeraCrypt volume was only based on the password strength because VeraCrypt was using a fixed number of iterations.<br>
With the introduction of PIM, VeraCrypt has a 2-dimensional security space for volumes based on the couple (Password, PIM). This provides more flexibility for adjusting the desired security level while also controlling the performance of the mount/boot operation.</p>
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ When creating a volume or when changing the password, the user has the possibili
<div>During the creation of a volume or the encryption of the system, VeraCrypt forces the PIM value to be greater than or equal to a certain minimal value when the password is less than 20 characters. This check is done in order to ensure that, for short passwords,
the security level is at least equal to the default level provided by an empty PIM.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
-<div>The PIM minimal value for short passwords is <strong>98</strong> for system encryption and
-<strong>485</strong> for non-system encryption and files containers. For password with 20 characters and more, the PIM minimal value is
+<div>The PIM minimal value for short passwords is <strong>98</strong> for system encryption that doesn't use SHA-512 or Whirlpool and
+<strong>485</strong> for the other cases. For password with 20 characters and more, the PIM minimal value is
<strong>1</strong>. In all cases, leaving the PIM empty or setting its value to 0 will make VeraCrypt use the default high number of iterations as explained in section
<a href="Header%20Key%20Derivation.html">
Header Key Derivation</a>.</div>
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Header Key Derivation</a>.</div>
Motivations behind using a custom PIM value can be:<br>
<ul>
<li>Add an extra secret parameter (PIM) that an attacker will have to guess </li><li>Increase security level by using large PIM values to thwart future development of brute force attacks.
-</li><li>Speeding up booting or mounting through the use of a small PIM value (less than 98 for system encryption and less than 485 for the other cases)
+</li><li>Speeding up booting or mounting through the use of a small PIM value (less than 98 for system encryption that doesn't use SHA-512 or Whirlpool and less than 485 for the other cases)
</li></ul>
<p>The screenshots below show the step to mount a volume using a PIM equal to 231:</p>
<table style="margin-left:auto; margin-right:auto">
diff --git a/src/Common/Password.c b/src/Common/Password.c
index e387604..8ba9137 100644
--- a/src/Common/Password.c
+++ b/src/Common/Password.c
@@ -133,14 +133,15 @@ BOOL CheckPasswordCharEncoding (HWND hPassword, Password *ptrPw)
}
-BOOL CheckPasswordLength (HWND hwndDlg, unsigned __int32 passwordLength, int pim, BOOL bForBoot, BOOL bSkipPasswordWarning, BOOL bSkipPimWarning)
+BOOL CheckPasswordLength (HWND hwndDlg, unsigned __int32 passwordLength, int pim, BOOL bForBoot, int bootPRF, BOOL bSkipPasswordWarning, BOOL bSkipPimWarning)
{
- BOOL bCustomPimSmall = ((pim != 0) && (pim < (bForBoot? 98 : 485)))? TRUE : FALSE;
+ BOOL bootPimCondition = (bForBoot && (bootPRF != SHA512 && bootPRF != WHIRLPOOL))? TRUE : FALSE;
+ BOOL bCustomPimSmall = ((pim != 0) && (pim < (bootPimCondition? 98 : 485)))? TRUE : FALSE;
if (passwordLength < PASSWORD_LEN_WARNING)
{
if (bCustomPimSmall)
{
- Error (bForBoot? "BOOT_PIM_REQUIRE_LONG_PASSWORD": "PIM_REQUIRE_LONG_PASSWORD", hwndDlg);
+ Error (bootPimCondition? "BOOT_PIM_REQUIRE_LONG_PASSWORD": "PIM_REQUIRE_LONG_PASSWORD", hwndDlg);
return FALSE;
}
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ BOOL CheckPasswordLength (HWND hwndDlg, unsigned __int32 passwordLength, int pim
}
#endif
- if ((pim != 0) && (pim > (bForBoot? 98 : 485)))
+ if ((pim != 0) && (pim > (bootPimCondition? 98 : 485)))
{
// warn that mount/boot will take more time
Warning ("PIM_LARGE_WARNING", hwndDlg);
diff --git a/src/Common/Password.h b/src/Common/Password.h
index 9afcd06..b2b0511 100644
--- a/src/Common/Password.h
+++ b/src/Common/Password.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ typedef struct
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(TC_WINDOWS_DRIVER) && !defined(_UEFI)
void VerifyPasswordAndUpdate ( HWND hwndDlg , HWND hButton , HWND hPassword , HWND hVerify , unsigned char *szPassword , char *szVerify, BOOL keyFilesEnabled );
-BOOL CheckPasswordLength (HWND hwndDlg, unsigned __int32 passwordLength, int pim, BOOL bForBoot, BOOL bSkipPasswordWarning, BOOL bSkipPimWarning);
+BOOL CheckPasswordLength (HWND hwndDlg, unsigned __int32 passwordLength, int pim, BOOL bForBoot, int bootPRF, BOOL bSkipPasswordWarning, BOOL bSkipPimWarning);
BOOL CheckPasswordCharEncoding (HWND hPassword, Password *ptrPw);
int ChangePwd (const wchar_t *lpszVolume, Password *oldPassword, int old_pkcs5, int old_pim, BOOL truecryptMode, Password *newPassword, int pkcs5, int pim, int wipePassCount, HWND hwndDlg);
diff --git a/src/Format/Tcformat.c b/src/Format/Tcformat.c
index 5b1b0d1..09c5270 100644
--- a/src/Format/Tcformat.c
+++ b/src/Format/Tcformat.c
@@ -4404,7 +4404,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
SetFocus (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_PIM));
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString (SysEncInEffect ()? "PIM_SYSENC_HELP" : "PIM_HELP"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString (SysEncInEffect () && hash_algo != SHA512 && hash_algo != WHIRLPOOL? "PIM_SYSENC_HELP" : "PIM_HELP"));
ToHyperlink (hwndDlg, IDC_LINK_PIM_INFO);
@@ -6238,7 +6238,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
if (volumePassword.Length > 0)
{
// Check password length (check also done for outer volume which is not the case in TrueCrypt).
- if (!CheckPasswordLength (NULL, volumePassword.Length, volumePim, FALSE, Silent, Silent))
+ if (!CheckPasswordLength (NULL, volumePassword.Length, volumePim, FALSE, 0, Silent, Silent))
{
exit (1);
}
@@ -7514,7 +7514,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
return 1;
}
// Check password length (check also done for outer volume which is not the case in TrueCrypt).
- else if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, volumePassword.Length, 0, SysEncInEffect(), FALSE, FALSE))
+ else if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, volumePassword.Length, 0, SysEncInEffect(), SysEncInEffect()? hash_algo : 0, FALSE, FALSE))
{
return 1;
}
@@ -7601,7 +7601,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
return 1;
}
// Check password length (check also done for outer volume which is not the case in TrueCrypt).
- else if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, volumePassword.Length, volumePim, SysEncInEffect(), TRUE, FALSE))
+ else if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, volumePassword.Length, volumePim, SysEncInEffect(), SysEncInEffect()? hash_algo : 0, TRUE, FALSE))
{
return 1;
}
diff --git a/src/Mount/Mount.c b/src/Mount/Mount.c
index b0439ea..6a4a57a 100644
--- a/src/Mount/Mount.c
+++ b/src/Mount/Mount.c
@@ -2672,7 +2672,19 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PasswordChangeDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPAR
else if (!(newKeyFilesParam.EnableKeyFiles && newKeyFilesParam.FirstKeyFile != NULL)
&& pwdChangeDlgMode == PCDM_CHANGE_PASSWORD)
{
- if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, GetWindowTextLength(GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_PASSWORD)), pim, bSysEncPwdChangeDlgMode, FALSE, FALSE))
+ int bootPRF = 0;
+ if (bSysEncPwdChangeDlgMode)
+ {
+ try
+ {
+ VOLUME_PROPERTIES_STRUCT properties;
+ BootEncObj->GetVolumeProperties(&properties);
+ bootPRF = properties.pkcs5;
+ }
+ catch(...)
+ {}
+ }
+ if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, GetWindowTextLength(GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_PASSWORD)), pim, bSysEncPwdChangeDlgMode, bootPRF, FALSE, FALSE))
return 1;
}