VeraCrypt
aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/Common/Volumes.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/Common/Volumes.c')
-rw-r--r--src/Common/Volumes.c12
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/src/Common/Volumes.c b/src/Common/Volumes.c
index c88e81d..4e7bd0e 100644
--- a/src/Common/Volumes.c
+++ b/src/Common/Volumes.c
@@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ ret:
#endif
// Creates a volume header in memory
-int CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (BOOL bBoot, char *header, int ea, int mode, Password *password,
+int CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (HWND hwndDlg, BOOL bBoot, char *header, int ea, int mode, Password *password,
int pkcs5_prf, char *masterKeydata, PCRYPTO_INFO *retInfo,
unsigned __int64 volumeSize, unsigned __int64 hiddenVolumeSize,
unsigned __int64 encryptedAreaStart, unsigned __int64 encryptedAreaLength, uint16 requiredProgramVersion, uint32 headerFlags, uint32 sectorSize, BOOL bWipeMode)
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ int CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (BOOL bBoot, char *header, int ea, int mode, Pass
bytesNeeded = EAGetKeySize (ea) * 2; // Size of primary + secondary key(s)
}
- if (!RandgetBytes (keyInfo.master_keydata, bytesNeeded, TRUE))
+ if (!RandgetBytes (hwndDlg, keyInfo.master_keydata, bytesNeeded, TRUE))
return ERR_CIPHER_INIT_WEAK_KEY;
}
else
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ int CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (BOOL bBoot, char *header, int ea, int mode, Pass
cryptoInfo->mode = mode;
// Salt for header key derivation
- if (!RandgetBytes (keyInfo.salt, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, !bWipeMode))
+ if (!RandgetBytes (hwndDlg, keyInfo.salt, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, !bWipeMode))
return ERR_CIPHER_INIT_WEAK_KEY;
// PBKDF2 (PKCS5) is used to derive primary header key(s) and secondary header key(s) (XTS) from the password/keyfiles
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ BOOL WriteEffectiveVolumeHeader (BOOL device, HANDLE fileHandle, byte *header)
// Writes randomly generated data to unused/reserved header areas.
// When bPrimaryOnly is TRUE, then only the primary header area (not the backup header area) is filled with random data.
// When bBackupOnly is TRUE, only the backup header area (not the primary header area) is filled with random data.
-int WriteRandomDataToReservedHeaderAreas (HANDLE dev, CRYPTO_INFO *cryptoInfo, uint64 dataAreaSize, BOOL bPrimaryOnly, BOOL bBackupOnly)
+int WriteRandomDataToReservedHeaderAreas (HWND hwndDlg, HANDLE dev, CRYPTO_INFO *cryptoInfo, uint64 dataAreaSize, BOOL bPrimaryOnly, BOOL bBackupOnly)
{
char temporaryKey[MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE];
char originalK2[MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE];
@@ -1096,8 +1096,8 @@ int WriteRandomDataToReservedHeaderAreas (HANDLE dev, CRYPTO_INFO *cryptoInfo, u
while (TRUE)
{
// Temporary keys
- if (!RandgetBytes (temporaryKey, EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), FALSE)
- || !RandgetBytes (cryptoInfo->k2, sizeof (cryptoInfo->k2), FALSE))
+ if (!RandgetBytes (hwndDlg, temporaryKey, EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), FALSE)
+ || !RandgetBytes (hwndDlg, cryptoInfo->k2, sizeof (cryptoInfo->k2), FALSE))
{
nStatus = ERR_PARAMETER_INCORRECT;
goto final_seq;