VeraCrypt
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authorMounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr>2014-07-26 15:46:17 (GMT)
committerMounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr>2014-11-08 22:21:40 (GMT)
commit97154aaf51efe787dd1678c8e1baeeb65ce46fe1 (patch)
tree0034e3b6d3c272ceb35b3b186305e8510afc64c5 /src
parent1ddae209326858f1c244a4b52ba2bd068cc8985a (diff)
downloadVeraCrypt-97154aaf51efe787dd1678c8e1baeeb65ce46fe1.zip
VeraCrypt-97154aaf51efe787dd1678c8e1baeeb65ce46fe1.tar.gz
Lower number of times we overwrite volume header during the encryption of a partition if the user choose to wipe the driver. Latest studies show that even one pass is enough to make data irretrievable. A value of 3 is a conservative approach that enhance performance without scarifying security. http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/16130-The-Urban-Legend-of-Multipass-Hard-Disk-Overwrite.html http://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2009/01/15/overwriting-hard-drive-data/
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/Common/Crypto.h3
-rw-r--r--src/Format/InPlace.c8
2 files changed, 7 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/Common/Crypto.h b/src/Common/Crypto.h
index e66ac18..ac92509 100644
--- a/src/Common/Crypto.h
+++ b/src/Common/Crypto.h
@@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ typedef struct
# define PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES 256
#endif
+/* specific value for volume header wipe used only when drive is fully wiped. */
+#define PRAND_HEADER_WIPE_PASSES 3
+
#if !defined (TC_WINDOWS_BOOT) || defined (TC_WINDOWS_BOOT_AES)
# include "Aes.h"
#else
diff --git a/src/Format/InPlace.c b/src/Format/InPlace.c
index 228e2e5..b1bfac9 100644
--- a/src/Format/InPlace.c
+++ b/src/Format/InPlace.c
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ int EncryptPartitionInPlaceBegin (volatile FORMAT_VOL_PARAMETERS *volParams, vol
area is occuppied by data until the very end of the process). */
// Prepare the backup header
- for (int wipePass = 0; wipePass < (wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? 1 : PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES); wipePass++)
+ for (int wipePass = 0; wipePass < (wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? 1 : PRAND_HEADER_WIPE_PASSES); wipePass++)
{
nStatus = CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (FALSE,
header,
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ int EncryptPartitionInPlaceBegin (volatile FORMAT_VOL_PARAMETERS *volParams, vol
0,
volParams->headerFlags | TC_HEADER_FLAG_NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC,
volParams->sectorSize,
- wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? FALSE : (wipePass < PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES - 1));
+ wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? FALSE : (wipePass < PRAND_HEADER_WIPE_PASSES - 1));
if (nStatus != 0)
goto closing_seq;
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ inplace_enc_read:
SetNonSysInplaceEncUIStatus (NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC_STATUS_FINALIZING);
- for (int wipePass = 0; wipePass < (wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? 1 : PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES); wipePass++)
+ for (int wipePass = 0; wipePass < (wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? 1 : PRAND_HEADER_WIPE_PASSES); wipePass++)
{
nStatus = CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (FALSE,
header,
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ inplace_enc_read:
masterCryptoInfo->RequiredProgramVersion,
masterCryptoInfo->HeaderFlags | TC_HEADER_FLAG_NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC,
masterCryptoInfo->SectorSize,
- wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? FALSE : (wipePass < PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES - 1));
+ wipeAlgorithm == TC_WIPE_NONE ? FALSE : (wipePass < PRAND_HEADER_WIPE_PASSES - 1));
if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
goto closing_seq;